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ABSTRACT 
 
In this study, we investigate the relationship between credit ratings and audit opinions of financially distressed 
companies impending bankruptcy. Using Korean publicly-held firms for the years 2007 through 2014, we analyze 
97 bankrupt companies with credit rating available before they file bankruptcy. Following prior research (Geiger et 
al., 2005), we find that the propensity to issue a going concern audit opinion is associated with the credit score 
issued by NICE immediately prior to the audit opinion date. We also compare credit ratings to audit opinions to 
investigate which of the two is more conservative and provides the earlier signal of bankruptcy. Through empirical 
test, we can conclude that audit system has more successfully predictive function in signaling preceding bankruptcy 
than CRAs' system with overly optimism. We argue that after a string of high-profile corporate failures such as 
Enron and Arthur Anderson’s bankruptcies, legislators portrayed auditors negatively and ultimately led to the 
enactment and more forced liabilities and thus auditors become more conservative. To remedy CRAs' failure by 
providing overly optimism, we suggest that like as auditors, CRAs' regulations should be more strengthened on their 
liability about issuing credit ratings. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
n this study, we investigate whether credit ratings influence audit opinions of financially distressed 
firms facing bankruptcy as well as which of the two is more conservative and provides more relevant 
information.  
 
Credit ratings represent the opinions of rating agencies about credit risk, which is the ability and willingness of a 
borrower or an issuer of a debt security, such as a corporation, state, or city government, to meet its financial 
obligations. In addition, credit rating agencies (CRAs) also publish ratings concerning the credit quality of specific 
issues, such as a bond or other debt obligation, and the relative likelihood that it may default (S&P, 2015).  
 
The role of the audit is to determine whether the reports prepared by the manager conform to the contract’s 
provisions, including the agreed-upon accounting principles. Thus, the auditor’s verification of financial information 
adds credibility to the report and reduces information risk, or the risk that information circulated by a company is 
false or misleading, potentially benefiting both the owner and manager. While other forms of monitoring might be 
possible, the extensive presence of auditing in such situations suggests that auditing is a cost-effective monitoring 
device.  
 
With common points between the credit rating and auditing, both play an important role in capital markets by 
providing investors and other related parties with information about the relative financial strength of the companies 
they rate or audit. The Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 points out the gravity of both auditors and credit rating agencies 
(CRAs) in helping to maintain the efficient performance of US industries (Dodd–Frank Act, 2010, Section 931, 
par.1). Gray, Mirkovic and Ragunathan, (2006) show that credit ratings are of great practical importance, as they 
influence a firm’s cost of debt, its financing structure, and even its ability to continue operating. Furthermore, 
pension plans and some other government-regulated investment groups have limited trade financial goods rated 
I 
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“investment grade” by the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO1). AICPA (1988) 
reported that although auditors do not give an opinion on a client’s creditworthiness, they are required to report if 
there is doubt about a client’s ability to continue as a going-concern (GC). Geiger et al. (1998) and Kausar, Taffler, 
and Tan (2009) find that a GC audit opinion has significant economic consequences for a company, such as negative 
stock returns and an increased likelihood of bankruptcy. 
 
Like most business, CRAs continuously face challenges. CRAs’ legitimacy and acceptability have been questioned. 
Some blame CRAs’ allegedly inflated ratings for contributing to the recent financial crisis (Story, 2011). The 
Economist and Nobel laureate Joseph Stigler state, “They were the party that performed the alchemy that converted 
the securities from F-rated to A-rated. The banks could not have done what they did without the complicity of the 
rating agencies.” In a naturally very concentrated industry, in which most users of ratings do not directly pay for 
them, the former NRSRO status that prevailed for decades and the embeddedness of ratings in rules and regulations 
excessively protected the agencies from any competitive threat. This does not prohibit rivalry amongst the agencies 
from being intense, as the practices of ratings’ shopping and notching suggest, but the big CRAs continue to be too 
comfortable in the industry when their quality is not monitored closely by their users. Although in the long run, 
CRAs have an incentive to provide the best possible quality to remain prominent CRAs that investors systematically 
refer to, in the short run, their profits increase much more by rating more issues than by improving quality. With the 
context of rating shopping, improved methodology, and due diligence would have scared away some initiators or 
arrangers to a rival's more lenient rating. The reputation, independence, disclosure, and accuracy of CRAs may stand 
at a crossroads. As their credibility has been damaged, we assume that CRAs have a deep incentive to improve their 
qualities. However, at this time, regulators still allow the CRAs to do their jobs without license and intrusive 
prescription about how to issue credit ratings, leaving the market open to entry and relying on self-reinforcing 
transparency in compliance with the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) code2 about the 
conduct of a ratings business. There is a real caveat that codes and regulations could undermine the responsibilities 
of boards and management, which can simply check them off without worrying about the principles they perform. It 
is fact that the subprime crisis occurred while the CRAs had already adapted the IOSCO code. Therefore, the former 
NRSRO status may have fallen in June 2007, as the subprime mortgage crisis was just revealing itself but after the 
vast volume of problematic residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs) had been rated and issued.  
 
Contrary to the CRAs, there have been continuous key changes in the audit environment since the early 1990s, 
which collectively could influence the relationship between auditors’ GC reporting and auditors’ litigation. An 
important aspect of the audit environment is tightened regulations to audit services that allow third parties, such as 
investors, to sue auditors in an effect to recover damages. The Center for Audit Quality (2008) reports auditor 
litigation costs were 15.1 percent of their domestic auditing revenues for the six largest auditing firms for 2007, 
asserting that “auditors face liability exposure dramatically more onerous than any other type of business.” For 
example, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) amended the Securities Act of 1934 and 
offered a stay on discovery until the courts reached a decision on a motion to dismiss the lawsuit. In addition, the 
SPSLRA imposed a stricter pleading standard and generally eliminated joint and several liabilities. The Sarbanes–
Oxley Act (SOX) (2002) required management certifications, audits of internal control systems, and the 
establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to govern auditors. Both acts were 
enacted in 2002 (Kaplan & Williams, 2013). Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB, 
2011) issued a concept release for comments concerning alternatives to the audit report, aimed to enhance its 
usefulness. Comprehensive effort has been made to amend and improve audit quality and risk after the SOX, sub-
prime mortgage crisis, Enron scandal, and so on, and tightened regulations for audit service and the audit service 
system have been enacted positively and provided more useful information for managers, investors, regulators, and 
related parties than CRAs.  
                                                
1
 NRSROs issue credit ratings that the US SEC permits other financial firms to use for certain regulatory purposes. According to the SEC, “the 
single most important factors in the Commission staff's assessment of NRSRO status is whether the rating agency is nationally recognized in the 
U.S. as an issuer of credible and reliable ratings by the predominant users of securities ratings” (SEC, 2003, p.9, requoted in Feldman and Read, 
2013). 
2
 According to the IOSCO code, the principles for the activities of CRAs are as follows. 1) Rating actions should reduce information asymmetry. 
2) Rating actions should be independent and objective. 3) CRAs should pursue transparency and disclosure. 4) CRAs should keep confidential all 
non-public information. 
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The motivation to investigate this subject is continuous dissatisfaction with both credit ratings and audit opinions. 
Although CRAs and auditors produce a similar public good to financial markets, such as credit rating and audit 
opinion, there is little research about the relationship between CRAs and auditors. In addition, unlike auditors, 
CRAs’ liability to investors is immaterial. CRAs have been criticized widely for not warning the public adequately 
about impending bankruptcies and for their role in the sub-prime mortgage crisis (Dodd-Frank, 2010). Similarly, 
auditors were criticized for accounting scandals, such as Enron, and high-profile bankruptcies. Harris (2011) points 
out that auditors are unable to signal financial risks with the existing audit report model and the GC opinion was 
rarely used or reported, despite the many risks that threatened the banking industry. 
 
There is little literature about how credit ratings influence audit opinion in distressed firms. Many studies have 
modeled the GC decision, yet the relationship between credit ratings and audit opinions remains largely untested. 
Similarly, the literature on credit rating has not directly assessed the impact that the audit opinion has on 
determining a firm's credit rating. In this research, we investigate Korea firms that filed for bankruptcy and we 
examine the audit opinions and credit ratings issued by NICE3 as a NRSRO, prior to bankruptcy. Most sample 
companies are in financial distress, therefore providing a setting in which both a GC opinion4 and a lowest possible 
credit rating are plausible. With samples of the financially distressed firms, we know with certainty that these firms 
did not continue operations and thereby the lowest possible credit rating and GC opinion may be taken for granted. 
Based on a GC (modified opinion) model, we find empirical results that credit ratings inform audits’ GC decisions 
for clients subsequently filing for bankruptcy. Of 49 of our total sample of 97 companies (50.52%) that had the 
lowest credit rating category prior to the audit opinion date, all but 9 (81.63%) received a GC opinion. We 
conducted an analysis to find evidence of more conservative and relevant auditor reporting relative to credit ratings 
with respect to signaling bankruptcy. Nine out of the 49 samples (18.37%) with lowest credit rating did not receive a 
GC opinion from auditors. We can analyze this frequency as only credit ratings being successful. However, there are 
20 (41.67%) firms with a GC opinion with ratings higher than the lowest. We can analyze this frequency as only 
auditors being successful.  
 
This study contributes new insight into the credit ratings literature by providing empirical evidence that credit 
ratings inform auditors’ GC opinions for firms that subsequently file for bankruptcy. In addition, we find that firms 
that have credit ratings closer to default in the month preceding the audit opinion date are significantly more likely 
to receive a GC opinion. For approximately 49 out of 97 of the final samples (50.52%) that had the lowest credit 
rating category prior to the audit opinion date, 40 (81.63%) received a GC opinion. Furthermore, we find evidence 
that audit opinions are more conservative and relevant to signal bankruptcy than credit ratings. 
 
There are several limitations of this research. First, there is no clear definition of when a credit rating indicates a 
likely bankruptcy. Second, our analysis of credit ratings is limited to those compiled only by NICE. Third, the 
regression model we adopt in the main analysis cannot determine causality. We do not test whether GC opinions 
result in credit rating changes, nor do we examine the impact of GC reports or other factors that may effect changes 
of credit rating. Therefore, this results in a potential endogeneity problem in which audit opinion has informational 
value.  
 
Section 2 provides the background and development of our hypothesis. Section 3 describes the sample selection, and 
presents the research design and results of the empirical test. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES  
 
2.1 Auditors’ Legal Liability 
 
In this era of litigation against auditors for malpractice, investors and creditors who suffer financial losses and 
experience market downturns are likely to be targets for recovery through lawsuits. Auditors should approach every 
engagement with the prospect that they may be required to defend their work in court. However, the concern of 
                                                
3  NICE is one of the largest and the leading credit information service company in South Korea. 
4  In this study, we define “Going Concern” opinion as modified opinions that are other than unqualified opinions. 
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litigation is not only costs; lawsuits damage a professional's reputation. If auditors are negligent in expressing an 
opinion on financial statements, thousands of investors, as well as firm creditors, may sustain losses. 
 
In Korea, auditors have both common law and statutory law liability. Common law liability develops through case 
decisions generally arising as a result of a breach of contract, negligence, and fraud. Statutory liability develops 
when a government unit passes laws and regulations that either implicitly or explicitly impose potential liability 
upon auditors. 
 
In addition, in many cases, an auditor has a liability to third parties under common law. Under the known-user case, 
auditors are held liable for ordinary negligence only to third-party beneficiaries for whose benefit the audit was 
performed. Other third parties must prove gross negligence on the part of the auditors. Under the foreseen-user case, 
liability for ordinary negligence to third parties is extended to include any limited class of parties that could be 
foreseen to rely upon the financial statements. The foreseen-user case extends the auditors’ liability for ordinary 
negligence even further to include any third party the auditors could reasonably foresee as recipients of the financial 
statements. In addition, auditors may be held liable to third parties under the securities trading laws, which allow 
class action lawsuits by purchasers or sellers of company securities. The Securities Trading Act is unique in that 
most of the burden of proof in litigation is shifted to auditors, with the primary defenses available to the auditor 
consisting of knowledge by the plaintiffs of errors or omissions or due diligence by the auditors. Furthermore, 
auditors are subject to criminal prosecution for violation of various statutes, including criminal fraud in which their 
conduct was intentional or involved collusion with the client. To protect themselves from litigation, auditors have 
strived to adhere to high levels of professional performance. 
 
2.2 Importance of Going-Concern Reporting 
 
Concerning the role of auditors, legislators periodically focus on instances of firms filing for bankruptcy after 
receiving am unmodified (standard) audit reporting and question the role of auditors in warning the public about 
impending bankruptcy (U.S. House of Representatives, 2008; U.S. Senate, 2002). The PSLRA (1995) requires that 
“each auditor ... of the financial statements of an issuer by an independent certified public accountant shall 
include ... an evaluation of weather there is substantial doubt about the ability of issuer to continue as a GC during 
the ensuring fiscal year.” The GC reporting provisions of the PSLRA (1995) essentially codified the professional 
standards at the time into law. However, the fact that the Congress mandated a specific audit procedure for all SEC 
registrant audits for the first time by elevating going-concern reporting to the status of law is indicative of 
legislators’ concerns about early warning of impending client bankruptcies in the form of modified audit opinions. 
Currently, to protect themselves and avoid liability, auditors are willing to report modified (going-concern) opinion, 
which is a relevant method to avoid high-risk litigation and lose their reputation, if substantial doubt remains about 
their client’s ability to continue as a GC after considering management’s plan. 
 
2.3 Litigation Risk and Audit Reporting  
 
The absence of a GC report for a financially stressed client leaves auditors vulnerable to litigation, as investors may 
allege reporting failure if a GC report was not issued (Carcello & Palmrose, 1994; Geiger & Rama, 2006). 
Furthermore, resignation and/or additional efforts are likely to be poor substitutes when the auditor is at the stage of 
making a GC reporting decision. As the GC report represents uncertainty about the future, the ability of an 
additional audit effort to resolve uncertainties about the client’s future viability may be limited. Issuing a GC report 
to a financially stressed client generally should eliminate the possibility of the auditor being accused of negligence 
with respect to GC reporting. We argue that investors that have suffered losses in their-financially stressed 
investments would be predisposed to consider the absence of a GC report as a reporting failure. In general, Hawkins 
and Hastie (1990) and Harley (2007) show that individuals exhibit hindsight bias, which is the tendency to 
overestimate the predictability of an event outcome when it is known. Having formed a directional decision 
preference, individuals engage in motivated or biased reasoning to reach their decisions (Kunda, 1999). For 
example, for investors that have suffered losses in their financially stressed investment and wish to sue the auditor, 
reaching the decision to sue the auditor is the preferred conclusion. Under motivated reasoning theory, Kunda 
(1999) assert that individuals “search for, interpret, and process information in a biased manner and, consequently, 
are more likely to reach the preferred conclusion.”  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2016 Volume 32, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 625 The Clute Institute 
Generally, managers of companies prefer that audit reports do not contain GC opinions. Thus, Carcello and Neal 
(2003) and Lennox (2000) find that issuing a GC audit report increases the likelihood of management-initiated 
auditor switches. From the previous paragraph, we can infer the expected benefits to auditors from issuing a GC 
report. The auditors are willing to accept to resign as a result of issuing a GC report because their clients have 
undergone hardships; legal costs in which auditors are named in court due to alleging auditing negligence 
represented more than 15% of U.S. domestic audit revenues for 2007 (The Center for Audit Quality, 2008). In other 
ways, to enhance their defensibility, auditors may increase their number of audit hours or resign from the audit 
engagement. Nevertheless, the auditors may intentionally decide not to issue a GC opinion to accommodate the 
client’s preference. However, auditors’ GC decision is related to the quality of the auditor’s performance and 
mitigates the information asymmetry between the firm’s management and outside related parties. 
 
2.4 Role, Failures, and Remedies of and for Credit Rating Agencies 
 
CRAs have been criticized for their role in the recent financial crisis, such as failure to flag mortgage-backed 
securities. Investors and banks lost hundreds of billions of dollars because of misguided confidence in sub-prime 
securities. According to Moody’s Investors Service (2001), credit ratings are used by investors to evaluate the credit 
risk of borrowers and are important because many investors explicitly or implicitly restrict themselves to dealing 
with counterparties whose credit ratings are above minimum levels. Moreover, there is a thin market for debt issued 
without credit ratings. Nicholls (2005) finds that debt issued without credit ratings tends to be issued at lower prices, 
thereby carrying higher effective interest rates than corresponding debt with credit ratings. For example, debt held 
by banks for capital requirement purposes, as well as most debt investments held by pension funds, are required to 
have credit ratings above a threshold, such as investment grade. Frost (2007) argues that prior to 2008, the three 
biggest CRAs—Standard & Poor's, Moody’s, and Fitch—provided credit ratings for mortgage-backed securities that 
turned out to be far riskier than their ratings implied. These inflated ratings allegedly contributed to the recent 
financial crisis and called into question the credibility and independence of CRAs. Specifically, CRAs have been 
accused of recklessly abandoning the output of their quantitative models in order to satisfy security issuers’ desire 
for high ratings. In the case of U.S. CRAs, after the 2008 mortgage loan crisis, the Dodd–Frank Act triggered 
reforms to the current credit rating environment designed to correct two perceived issues: (1) CRAs are currently 
paid by security issuers, which gives them an incentive to inflate ratings; and (2) the rating process lacks 
transparency, which gives CRAs the opportunity to inflate ratings (Jollineau, Tanlu, and Winn, 2014). 
 
CRAs play a critical role in financial markets by providing investors with information about the companies they 
rate. In addition, auditors provide important signals to investors about a distressed company’s financial condition. 
However, there are quite differences between the characteristics of audits and credit ratings; auditors generally 
engage in a backward-looking, confirmatory task in judging whether the initial information provided by 
management falls within an acceptable range and is in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP). By contrast, credit rating analysts engage in a forward-looking, probabilistic task of judging the likelihood 
of a firm defaulting on a security (Jollineau et al., 2014). Unlike audit firms, CRAs have been protected historically 
from exposure to liability under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (Partnoy, 2006). The structure of the 
relationship between a client and its audit firm is quite different from the relationship between a CRA and its clients. 
Although auditors and CRAs are hired by the companies involved, auditors usually communicate directly with the 
audit committee of the board of directors, which helps their independence to be preserved. Auditors and CRAs have 
used clients’ financial data, but the audit firm spends more time and endeavor carrying out the audit and can require 
a client to provide information it deems necessary for the audit report. Management has no liability to comply with 
the CRA’s request for information. However, because the chief executive officer (CEO) is eager to obtain a better 
credit rating, companies extend more information to CRAs and make effort to secure friendly working relationships 
in their best interests. 
 
There are several important differences between auditors and CRAs regarding potential consequences of issuing a 
qualified audit opinion and lowest credit rating to a client that subsequently files for bankruptcy. For auditors, a 
more notable difference relates to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (Reform Act), which elevates 
the status of the auditor’s responsibility for GC reporting to that of law, instead of simply yet another audit 
procedure. In addition, with respect to auditors, Pryor and Terza (2001) and Venuti (2004) find that a widely held 
belief maintains that a company receiving a GC opinion is more likely to file for bankruptcy. Geiger, Raghunandan, 
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and Rama (1998) argues that the self-fulfilling prophecy, coupled with evidence of clients switching auditors after 
receiving a GC opinion, may make auditors cautious about issuing GC reports. However, according to Carcello and 
Palmrose (1994), failure to issue a GC opinion prior to a client’s bankruptcy is costly to auditors, both in terms of 
reputation and potentially costly litigation. Unlike auditors, CRAs are protected by the First Amendment right to 
free speech, thereby shielding CRAs from legal liability (Frost, 2007). 
 
Because CEOs are willing to provide CRAs with important information about financial merit, it seems to be argued 
plausibly that credit ratings might influence auditors in making their decisions on audit opinions. However, it is 
possible that CRAs’ ratings have harmful effects on auditors’ decisions if the CRAs do not issue timely downgrades 
when financial situations worsen and issue inflated ratings. Given the understanding that credit ratings extend useful 
information to the financial and stock markets and that ratings are related to auditor decision making, it is not 
surprising that both auditors and ratings agency analysts use common information, as they monitor a firm’s 
corporate governance mechanisms. For example, ratings agencies have stated that internal control weakness is 
important in ratings classification and that the assessment of internal control is a fundamental part of an audit. The 
relevant information set conveys beyond firm-specific data. Therefore, we suggest that auditors that carry out audits 
of companies with impending financial distress might be influenced by the clients’ credit ratings in issuing their 
audit opinions. Thus, we hypothesize the following. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Credit rating influences the issuance of a GC audit opinion, especially when companies face 
imminent bankruptcy. 
     
An interesting issue is the relative conservativeness of auditors and the major CRAs in their roles as watchdogs 
protecting investors against financial calamities. The various government and private watchdogs that were supposed 
to monitor Enron’s5 activities and warn investors of its impending bankruptcy did not fulfill their responsibilities. 
The staff report by the SEC was critical of Arthur Anderson for its issuance of a clean audit opinion prior to Enron’s 
collapse. The nationally recognized CRAs were criticized for continuing to rate Enron’s long-term debt as 
investment grade, even as its stock plummeted and collapsed in value in the weeks before the company’s demise. 
Cheng and Neamtiu (2009) state that the major NRSROs maintained investment grade ratings for Enron, California 
utilities, and other bankrupt companies, days before each declared bankruptcy. Given the prominent watchdog roles 
of auditors and the largest CRAs in providing the investing public with timely warnings of bankruptcy risk, an 
interesting question is whether one group is more conservative than the other. Although CRAs have been criticized 
widely, they have not been subjected to the same civil and criminal prosecution that applies to auditors. Rating 
agencies have been protected by the First Amendment as members of the media and the courts do not hold credit 
rating agencies accountable for providing misleading information, unless their actions were reckless. Kraft (2009) 
argues that accountants, on the other hand, face significant risk of legal liability and are held to a much higher 
standard than CRAs. Carcello and Palmrose (1994) find that failing to issue a GC opinion preceding bankruptcy 
filing subjects auditors to a higher likelihood of litigation. Therefore, an auditor may have more incentives to be 
conservative when contemplating a GC opinion relative to a CRA deciding to downgrade a company’s credit rating. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The audit opinion has more conservative and timely informational value than does the credit rating, 
especially when companies face imminent bankruptcy. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS 
 
3.1 Research Model 
 
To examine H1, we use a multivariate regression model with audit opinion type as the dependent variable and 
control variables used in prior research (Geiger, Ragunathan, and Rama, 2005). We investigate whether the 
propensity to issue a GC audit opinion is associated with the credit score issued by NICE immediately prior to the 
audit opinion date. Control variables contain firm size measured as annual sales, probability of bankruptcy measured 
                                                
5On October 24, 2001, the day Enron CFO, Andrew Fastow, resigned the stock traded at $16.41. On November 8, 2001, less than a month before 
Enron's bankruptcy, Enron's stock closed at $8.41, when Enron disclosed it had overstated earnings by $500,000 since 1997. Nevertheless, S&P 
continued to rate the firm through most of November at “investment grade.” 
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by the Zmijewski score, time between the audit opinion date and the bankruptcy filing date, time between the fiscal 
year-end and the audit opinion date, auditor type, and prior year audit opinion6, that is, whether the company 
received a GC report prior to the last audit opinion before bankruptcy. Using the measurement of credit rating by the 
variable Credit Category, we analyze whether credit rating influences GC opinion. 
 
GC = β0 + β1LnSL + β2ProB + β3BLAG + β4RLAG + β5BIG4 + β6PBAD + β7CC          (1) 
 
Where: 
 
GC = 1 if audit opinion is going-concern modified, and 0 otherwise; 
 
LnSL   = natural log of total sales; 
 
ProB = probability of bankruptcy measured by the Zmijewski score7; 
 
BLAG = natural lag of the number of days between the audit opinion date and bankruptcy date; 
 
RLAG = natural lag of the number of days between the fiscal year-end and audit opinion date; 
 
BIG4 = 1 if a Big Four auditor, and 0 otherwise; 
 
PBAD = 1 if the client was issued with a GC modification prior to the last opinion before bankruptcy; 
 
CC= 1 if the NICE score in the month preceding the audit opinion date is 10 (equivalent to D or SD); 2 if 
the NICE score in the month preceding the audit opinion date is 9 (equivalent to “lowest speculative” 
category); 3 if the NICE score in the month preceding the audit opinion date is 8 (equivalent to “medium 
speculative”); and 4 if the NICE score in the month preceding the audit opinion date is 6 or 7 (equivalent to 
“upper speculative”). 
 
3.2 Sample Selection 
 
The sample consists of Korean publicly held firms for the period 2007 through 2014, drawn from the KIS Value8. 
From the KIS Value, we select all Korean companies that filed for bankruptcy. Following prior research (Geiger et 
al., 2005), we eliminate any firm in financial services, with no fiscal year-end year, and with no credit rating. After 
identifying our initial sample, we select firms whose audit report date is 12 months or less prior to the bankruptcy 
filing, thereby identifying each firm as having received a GC report or unqualified (clean) audit opinion prior to 
filing for bankruptcy. In addition, we identify the fiscal year-end date, audit opinion date, auditor, credit rating 
month, and whether the firm was in technical or payment default. We access the KIS Value to acquire financial and 
industry data, specifically about firm size and financial variables related to bankruptcy. Table 1 shows the sample 
derivation, which results in a preliminary sample size of 149 companies that filed for bankruptcy. Then, we choose 
the subset of those companies that have credit ratings issued by NICE available prior to bankruptcy. Therefore, the 
final samples available are 97 observations, as shown in Table 1. 
 
  
                                                
6Reynolds and Franci (2000), Hunt and Lulseged (2007) find that companies issued with GC opinions in the preceding year are more likely to 
receive GC opinions in the current year. 
7The Zmijewski Score is a bankruptcy model (Zmijewski, 1984), used to predict a firm’s bankruptcy by probit analysis. Scores greater than X 
represent a higher probability of default. One of Zmijewski’s criticisms was that other bankruptcy scoring models oversampled distressed firms 
and favored situations with more complete data. 
 Formula: Zmijewski Score = -4.803-3.599* (net income/total assets) + 5.406* (total liabilities/total assets) - 0.100* (current assets/current 
liabilities) 
8  The KIS Value comprises industrial databases by NICE of Korean companies providing financial information to clients. 
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Table 1. Sample Selection Criteria 
Description Sample Number 
Firms filed bankruptcy 149 
- Firms involved in financial industries (5) 
- Firms not having year-end fiscal year (6) 
- Firms no credit rating (40) 
- Firms no audit opinion (1) 
 
We use the long-term issuer credit rating for each firm rated by NICE, as reported in the KIS Value, to define our 
credit rating categories. This reflects the organization’s assessment of the overall creditworthiness of the company. 
For better understanding, we use the NICE credit score instead of the credit rating and also compare the NICE credit 
score with the S&P credit rating, which is composed of 22 possible “letter” ratings ranging from AAA (highest) to D 
and SD (lowest). Since we restrict our sample to financially distressed companies, it is no wonder that 94 of our 97 
bankrupt firms have ratings within the non-investment grade range (from 4 to 10 for NICE credit scores, and from 
BB+ to D for S&P credit ratings). The NICE credit score codes these letter ratings numerically, with low numbers 
indicating better financial strength; we categorize the NICE credit scores into four groups with high numbers 
indicating better financial strength. In our sample, the NICE credit scores range from 3 (corresponding to AA−) to 
10 (corresponding to D or SD, by which S&P defines the companies as default or selective default). We define the 
variables and credit category, following prior studies (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond, 2006; Bradley, Chen, 
Dallas, and Synderwine, 2008). We categorize the credit ratings into categories that represent four levels of risk 
within the non-investment grade range. The highest group (upper speculative grade) encompasses credit ratings from 
BBB+ to BBB− (Category 4), while our lowest category consists of default (D) and selective default (SD) ratings 
(Category 1). In addition, we use a “medium speculative grade” that consists of credit ratings from B to CC 
(Category 3) and a “lower speculative grade” for ratings ranging in C (Category 2). Table 2 shows the credit ratings 
divided into four groups, the credit scores, and the number of sample firms with each credit score. 
 
Table 2. Credit scores and ratings of bankrupt firms, grade, assigned category, and number of firms with each credit score 
NICE Score Grade Category S&P Rating  No. of Firms 
1 extreme strong (investment) - AAA 0 
2 very strong (investment) - AA+ , AA 0 
3 strong (investment) - AA- 0 
4 still strong (investment) - A+ , A 0 
5 adequate (investment) - A- 0 
6 less vulnerable (speculative) 4 BBB+ to BBB 1 
7 more vulnerable (speculative) 4 BBB- 2 
8 currently vulnerable (speculative) 3 B, CC, CCC 19 
9 currently highly vulnerable (speculative) 2 C 26 
10 extremely vulnerable (default, SD) 1 D, SD 49 
    97 
 
We cannot figure out the exact date when CRAs issued credit scores or ratings, and therefore, we cannot grasp 
whether the issuance of credit ratings preceded or followed the date of the audit opinion in the month that the audit 
report was issued. Thus, we use the credit ratings from the month immediately preceding the audit opinion date for 
our research. Giving this reasoning, we presume that credit ratings are not influenced and reflected by information 
from audit opinions. Control variables include firm size, probability of bankruptcy, default status, the time between 
the audit opinion date and the bankruptcy filing date, and the time between the fiscal year-end and the audit opinion 
date. 
 
3.3 Empirical Results 
 
To test H1, we present means and standard deviations of variables in our model by four credit rating categories, 
using the analysis of variance method. We find significant differences in means through the rating categories 
(p<0.01 or p<0.05) for most variables. With consistent expectations, firms with poor credit ratings have a higher 
probability of bankruptcy, a shorter bankruptcy lag, more GC opinions, and a longer reporting lag. They hired the 
Big Four auditors less. An important consequence of the descriptive statistics is that the reporting lag, time that 
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auditors take after the fiscal year-end to issue their audit opinion, is longer when the client’s credit rating is poorer 
(toward lower speculative and closer default). 
 
The main concern of H1 is the relationship between GC opinions and credit rating categories. In Table 3, we can 
interpret clearly that companies with credit ratings “closer to default” in the month preceding the audit opinion date 
are more likely to receive GC opinions. In detail, we find that 40 of 49 firms (82%) in default or in selective default 
received GC opinions. On the other hand, firms assigned a rating in the “medium speculative” category (B, CC, and 
CCC) were issued GC opinions in less than one out of three cases. This analysis supports H1. 
 
Table 3. Variable Mean (Standard Deviation) by credit rating 
Credit Rating BBB+ to BBB- [Category 4] 
B,CC and CCC 
[Category 3] 
C 
[Category 2] 
D and SD 
[Category 1] 
 
Sample No. 3 19 26 49  
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
ANOVA 
F-statistics 
GC 0.33 0.26 0.54 0.82 8.07*** (0.58) (0.45) (0.51) (0.39) 
LnSL 22.75 24.57 24.93 23.88 3.77** (1.31) (1.44) (0.99) (1.83) 
ProB 0.03 0.49 0.79 0.99 35.76*** (0.03 (0.32) (0.34) (0.01) 
BLAG 4.64 4.25 3.95 3.21 9.41*** (1.20) (0.92) (1.26) (0.53) 
RLAG 4.26 4.43 4.45 4.49 3.21** (0.33) (0.31) (0.18) (0.15) 
PBAD 0 0.53 0.46 0.43 0.99 (0) (0.51) (0.51) (0.5) 
BIG4 0.33 0.21 0.58 0.27 3.22** (0.58) (0.42) (0.50) (0.45) 
***, **, * indicate a significant difference between companies with different credit ratings at p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1, respectively 
 
To examine further the relationship between receiving GC opinions and credit ratings, we describe the percentage of 
GC reports over credit ratings and illustrate these results in Figure 1. This analysis shows that as credit ratings 
become more speculative, that is, credit ratings are no higher than “C,” the auditor is inclined toward issuing a GC 
opinion. 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of bankrupt companies receiving a going-concern opinion by credit rating 
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Although the results in Table 3 and Figure 1 obviously suggest a strong relationship between GC opinions and credit 
ratings, we need to test the relationship further using a multivariate model. Table 4 tabulates the results of two 
logistic regressions based on the model, using 97 bankrupt companies in our sample. Column 1 shows the results for 
the model with only the control variables. Column 2 repeats the test but includes the variable Credit Category, 
thereby testing H1. Both columns are highly significant (p<0.01) with χ2 of 55.98 and 59.98, respectively. The 
variable of interest, Credit Category, is significant with χ2 of 3.83 (p<0.05). Overall, our empirical results support 
H1, suggesting that the information provided by a client’s credit rating is reflected in the audit opinion. That is, there 
is a negative relationship between credit ratings and GC opinions. A comparison between Columns 1 and 2 shows 
that including the Credit Category variable improves interpretation power from 59.63% to 62.71%. The control 
variables for firm size, bankruptcy probability, report lag, and Big Four are in the expected directions. The variables 
for report lag is statistically significant.  
 
Table 4. Output of logistic regression model 
Variable Column 1 Coefficient (χ2) 
Column 2 
Coefficient (χ2) 
Constant -8.26 -6.64 (0.01) (0.01) 
LnSL -0.09 -0.12 (0.39) (0.51) 
ProB 1.84
*** 0.72 
(7.30) (0.70) 
BLAG -0.33 -0.30 (1.95) (1.53) 
RLAG 2.06
* 2.28** 
(3.34) (4.59) 
PBAD -0.18 -0.11 (0.21) (0.08) 
BIG4 0.21 0.30 (0.21) 0.40 
Credit Category - -0.62** 
  (3.83) 
likelihood Ratio (χ2) 55.98*** 59.98*** 
Max rescaled R2  59.63% 62.71% 
***, **, * indicate a significant with p-values at p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1, respectively 
 
To verify whether an audit is more conservative and timely than a credit rating service in respect of providing a 
signal for impending bankruptcy, we examine H2. Because all sample companies went bankrupt within 12 months 
of the audit opinion, GC opinion or qualified opinion is desirable and appropriate. To define the appropriate credit 
rating for companies with impending bankruptcy, we use the S&P long-term credit rating structure9. The language 
S&P uses to describe its ratings indicates that the rating categories are relative. S&P defines its credit rating by 
category as follows: a CCC rating category is “currently vulnerable, and is dependent upon favorable business, 
financial and economic conditions to meet its financial commitments”; a CC rating category is “currently highly 
vulnerable to non-payment and is used when a default has not yet occurred, but Standard & Poor’s expects default to 
be a virtual certainty, regardless of the anticipated time to default“; and a C rating category is “currently highly 
vulnerable to non-payment, and the obligation is expected to have lower relative seniority or lower ultimate recovery 
compared to obligations that are rated higher” (S&P, 2015). This terminology is utilized. In most cases, unless the 
rating is deep into speculative category, a downgrade does not mean that default is anticipated (CRISIL, 2010; S&P 
2015). The deepest category within the speculative rating group is C. Considering the above descriptions, we are 
sure that an observation has an appropriate credit rating if the company with impending bankruptcy had a rating of D 
                                                
9Issuing credit ratings can be either long-term or short-term. Short-term ratings are generally assigned to those obligations considered short-term 
in the relevant market. In the U.S., for example, that means obligations with an original maturity of no more than 365 days—including 
commercial paper. Short-term ratings are also used to indicate the credit worthiness of an obligor with respect to put features on long-term 
obligations. Medium-term notes are assigned long-term ratings (sited from S&P rating definition)  
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or SD the month before the audit opinion was issued. To be considered as a desirable watchdog, CRAs preceding the 
audit opinion must assign lower than C and auditors must issue GC reports. Table 5 suggests the result of an χ2 test 
comparing successes in signaling bankruptcy for credit rating to success for the auditor. 
 
In 40 out of 49 observations (81.63%) with ratings of D and SD, the auditors issued GC opinions. Therefore, when 
CRAs issued very low ratings, the auditors almost always issued GC opinions. On the contrary, among the 48 
observations with ratings higher than C, there are 20 companies that received GC opinions from their auditors. 
Through our matrix of audit opinions and credit ratings, we can conclude and infer that the audit system has a more 
successful predictive function in signaling preceding bankruptcy than the CRAs system with over-optimism. Of 48 
credit ratings above C, 28 (58.33%) observations have unqualified audit opinions. Thus, we can assume that both 
auditors and CRAs incline to produce over-optimistic assessments. This analysis to test H2 is highly significant 
within an χ2 statistic of 16.41 (p<0.01). This result explains that auditors’ are more conservative than CRAs, which 
supports H2. 
 
Table 5. Comparison of audit opinion of impending bankruptcy and credit rating before issuing audit opinion 
 No GC opinion 
(Type II error) 
 GC opinion 
(negative signal) Total 
Rating higher than C 
(relatively desirable) 
28 
(58.33%) 
20 
(41.67%) 
48 
(49.48%) 
Rating D and SD 
(strong negative signal) 
9 
(18.37%) 
40 
(81.63%) 
49 
(50.52%) 
Total 37 (38.14%) 
60 
(61.86%) 
97 
(100%) 
χ2 statistic 16.41 with p<0.01     
 
 
Figure 2. Relative performance graph of auditors and CRAs (NICE) in signaling imminent bankruptcy 
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credit rating of D or SD. The auditor issued a GC modified report for 40 (81.63%) of these companies the following 
months. For the 48 companies with higher credit ratings, 20 companies (41.67%) received a GC from their auditors. 
In these cases, CRAs had room to lower its rating, but it did not. From this result, we can infer that the auditors take 
a more conservative and timely prospect than the CRAs. Though auditors have been criticized for high frequency of 
type II errors which 37 (38.14%) out of 97 total bankrupt sample companies, they seem to provide a timelier signal 
of impending bankruptcy relative to CRAs. Geiger et al. (2005) find that after a string of high-profile corporate 
failures such as Enron's bankruptcy on Dec. 2, 2001 by accounting manipulation which led to have Arthur Anderson 
audit company caused dissolution due to indulging willful corporate fraud and corruption, a series of congressional 
hearing and legislators portrayed auditors negatively and ultimately led to the enactment and more forced liabilities 
such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Due to these continuing concern of legislators and the public about the adequacy of 
early warnings from auditors about pending client failures in the form of modified audit opinion, it is certain that 
there was a significant shift in auditors' decision in the post-2002 period and that auditors' decisions were more 
conservative based on the forced enactment to auditor's liability than CRAs'. To remedy CRAs' failure for 
exacerbating the financial crisis by providing overly optimistic debt ratings in order to please security issuers with 
higher credit ratings, we find that audit system is better timelier and more conservative. According to audit 
experience on its failure and remedy, thus, it is desirable that CRAs' regulation should be more strengthened on their 
liability about issuing credit ratings. The empirical result in this study suggests that there is a CRAs' credit rating to 
influence audit behavior and audit opinion is more conservative than CRA's, which means audit is more credible and 
appropriate to interests of financial market. Like as case of auditor's endeavor in order to enhance their reputation, 
reduce litigation risk and be proactive to reduce government intervention after their audit opinion failure, CRAs' 
way to remedy their failure is to strengthen the regulation on their liability significantly in order to regain a positive 
reputation so that reduce the possible threat of litigation. Addition to the belief that CRAs' profession is self-
correcting, we suggest that regulators and standard setters should evaluate the extent of CRAs profession's changed 
behavior and aggressively modify the regulation to avoid further investors' damages due to inflated or (and) slowing 
downgraded ratings. 
 
There are several limitations of this study. First, there is no clear definition of when a credit rating is indicating a 
likely bankruptcy. Second, our analysis of credit ratings is limited to those compiled by only NICE. Third, the 
regression model we adopted in main analysis cannot determine causality. We did not test whether GC opinions 
result in credit rating changes and also examine the impact of GC report or other factors that may effect to change of 
credit rating. Therefore, it results in potential endogeneity problem which, audit opinion has informational value.  
We conclude with a discussion of limitation. Our study focuses only on Type II misclassification (bankruptcies 
without a prior going-concern modified opinion or without lowest credit rating). Though such audit 
misclassifications continue to be the focus of legislators, it is also critical to examine the Type I error (going-concern 
modified opinions for subsequently viable companies).  
 
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES 
 
Myungki Cha is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Graduate School of Business, Sogang University, 35 Baekbumro, 
Mapogu, Seoul, 121-742, South Korea. E-mail: mkcha70@hanmail.net (First author) 
 
Kookjae Hwang is a Professor at the School of Business, Sogang University, 35 Baekbumro, Mapogu, Seoul, 121-
742, South Korea. E-mail: Khwang@sogang.ac.kr (Main author) 
 
Youngjun Yeo is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Graduate School of Business, Sogang University, 35 Baekbumro, 
Mapogu, Seoul, 121-742, South Korea. E-mail: yjyeo@sogang.ac.kr (Corresponding author) 
 
REFERENCES 
 
AICPA (1988), Statement on auditing standards No. 59: The auditor's consideration of an entity's ability to continue as a 
Going Concern, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, New York, NY. 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., Collins, D. and LaFond, R. (2006), "The effects of corporate governance on firms' credit ratings", 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 42, pp. 203-243. 
Bradley, M., Chen, D., Dallas, G. and Synderwine, E. (2008), "The effects of corporate governance attributes on credit ratings 
and bond yields", available at: http://ssrn.com/absrtact=1327070 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2016 Volume 32, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 633 The Clute Institute 
Carcello, J. V. and Neal, T. (2003), "Audit Committee Characteristics and auditor dismissals following 'new' going-concern 
reports", the Accounting Review, January, pp.95-117. 
Carcello, J. V. and Palmrose, Z. (1994), "Auditor litigation and modified reporting on bankrupt clients", Journal of Accounting 
Research, Vol. 32, Supplement, pp.1-30. 
Center for Audit Quality (2008), "Report of the major public company audit firms to the department of the Treasury Advisory 
Committee on the auditing profession", Washington, DC. 
Cheng, M. and Neamtiu, M. (2009), "An empirical analysis of changes in credit rating properties: timeliness, accuracy and 
volatility", Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol.47, pp.108-130.  
CRISIL (2010), rating available at: www.crisil.com/credit-ratings-risk-assessment/rating-faqs-questions.htm#specurative-
grade  
Dodd-Frank (2010), Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law Number 111-203, 
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. 
Feldman D. and J. Read (2013), "Going-concern audit opinions for bankrupt companies - impact of credit rating”, Managerial 
Auditing Journal, Vol.28, No.4, pp.345-363. 
Frost, C. A. (2007), "Credit rating agencies in capital market: A review of research evidence on selected criticisms of the 
agencies", Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 22(3), pp.469-492. 
Geiger, M.A. and Raghunandan, K. and Rama, D. V. (1998), "Costs associated with going-concern modified audit opinions: 
An analysis of auditor changes, subsequent opinions and client failures", Advances in Accounting, Vol.16, pp.117-
139. 
Geiger, M. A., Raghunandan, K. and Rama, D. V. (2005), "Recent changes in the association between bankruptcies and prior 
audit opinions”, A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol.24 No.1, pp.21-35. 
Geiger, M., and Rama, D. V. (2005), "Audit firm size and going-concern reporting accuracy", Accounting Horizons 20 
(March): pp.1-18. 
Gray, S., Mirkovic, A. and Ragunathan, V. (2006), "The determinants of credit ratings: Australian evidence", Australian 
Journal of Management, Vol.31, No.2, pp.333-354. 
Harley, E. (2007), "Hindsight bias in legal decision making", Social Cognition 25 (Feb.), pp.48-63. 
Harris, S.B. (2011), “Concept release on possible revisions to PCAOB standards related to reports on audited financial 
statements”, June 21, available at: http://pcaobus.org/News/Speech/06212011_ HarrisStaement. aspx 
Hawkins, S., and R. Hastie (1990), "Hindsight: Biased judgement of past events after the outcomes are known", 
Psychological Bulletin 107(May), pp.311-327 
Jollineau S., Tanlu J. and Winn A. (2014), "Evaluating proposed remedies for credot rating agency failures", The Accounting 
Review, Vol.89, No.4, pp.1399-1420. 
Kaplan S. E. and Willams D., (2013), "Do going concern audit report protect auditors from litigation? A simultaneous 
equations approach", The Accounting Review, Vol.88, No.1, pp.199-232. 
Kausar, A., Taffler, R. and Tan. C. (2009), "The going-concern market anomaly", Journal of Accounting Research, Vol.47, 
No.1, pp.213-239. 
Kraft, P. (2009), "Rating agency adjustment to GAAP financial statements and their effect on ratings and bond yields", 
available at: http://www.papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1266381 
Kunda, Z. (1999), "Social cognition: Making sense of people", Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. 
Lennox, C. (2000), "Do companies successfully engege in opinion-shopping? Evidence from the UK", Journal of Economics 
and Business, Vol. 51(4), pp.347-364. 
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) (2001), "The unintended consequences of rating triggers", Special Comment, New York, 
NY: Moody's. 
Nicholls, C. C. (2005), "Public and private uses of credit ratings. In credit rating agencies: Need for reform in Canada?", 
Rotman School of Management, Capital Markets Institute. 
Partnoy, F. (2006), "How and why rating agencies are not like other gatekeepers", San Diego Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series, pp.07-46. 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), (1995). Public Law, No. 104-67, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office. 
Pryor, C. and Terza, J. (2001), "Are going-concern audit opinion a self-fulfilling prophecy?", Advances in Quantitative 
Analysis of Finance and Accounting, Vol.10, pp.89-116. 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), (2011), "Concept release on possible changes to the auditor's 
report", June 21, available at: www.pcaobus.drg/Ruledmaking/ 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P), (2015), Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services Credit Ratings & Research, available at: 
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (2002), Public Law Number 107-204, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. 
SEC (2003), Report on the role and function of credit rating agencies in the operation of the securities market, Security and 
Exchange Commission, Washington, DC. 
Story, L. (2011), " U.S. inquiry is said to focus on S&P ratings". The New York Times, August 17. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2016 Volume 32, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 634 The Clute Institute 
US House of Representative (2008), Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Credit Rating Agencies and Financial 
Crisis: Opening Statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman. 
US Senate (2002), "Financial Oversight of Enron: The SEC and Private-sector watchdogs", Report of the staff of the Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, Washington, DC. 
Venuti, E. K. (2004), "The going-concern assumption revisited: assessing a company's future viability", The CPA journal, Vol. 
74, No.5, pp.40-43. 
Zmijewski, M. (1984), "Methodological issues related to the estimation of financial distress prediction model", Journal of 
Accounting Research, Vol. 22 (supplement), pp.59-82.  
 
